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ANDREW P. VANCE MEMORIAL
WRITING COMPETITION WINNER
FACILITATING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: THE U.S. NEEDS FEDERAL
LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS
J. Noelle Hicks∗
I. INTRODUCTION

I

a decision dictating the United States’ (“U.S.”) policy on
upholding forum selection clauses in international business
contracts,1 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he
expansion of American business and industry will hardly be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our
laws and in our courts.”2 Chief Justice Warren Burger spoke
wisely, and his words recognize that the promotion of international trade and investment requires a stable legal infrastructure upon which the international business community can
N

∗ J.D. (Candidate, December 2002) University of Richmond, School of
Law; B.S., 1998, Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank Professors John
Paul Jones and Daniel Murphy of the University of Richmond School of Law
and my friends Tarek Azhari, Pamela Coleman, and Violet Cox for their
encouragement and support throughout my law school experience. I would
also like to thank Charles Homiller, Jr., my friend and colleague, for his
invaluable editing assistance during an earlier draft of this note. Finally, I
would like to thank Professor Kevin Clermont for introducing me to this topic
during his International Litigation course offered at the 2001 Cornell Law
School Institute of International and Comparative Law.
1. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
2. Id. at 9.
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rely.3 That infrastructure includes some sort of reliability relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments. Because of the
need for certainty, the U.S. and forty-eight other countries have
begun the negotiation of a treaty that will ensure that judgments issued in the courts of one signatory country will be enforced in the courts of other signatory countries.4 The proposed
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments5 (“Hague Convention” or “Convention”) addresses an important need internationally and has sparked a
debate in the U.S. over the need to federalize U.S. law concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments.6
In the U.S., the enforcement of foreign judgments is governed
on the state, not the federal, level.7 In fact, despite the expansion of international business and trade, the U.S. Supreme
Court has spoken only once on the issue of the enforcement of
foreign judgments, in Hilton v. Guyot.8 In that decision, the
Court outlined the U.S.’s attitude toward the decrees of foreign
courts.9 Hilton, though, is not binding law in the U.S.10
3. See Antonio F. Perez, The International Recognition of Judgments: The
Debate Between Private and Public Law Solutions, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’ L L. 44,
44 (2001).
4. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Future Hague
Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (last
visited Jan. 6, 2002). For further information on the history and progress of
this proposed Hague Convention, see generally Peter H. Pfund, The Project of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law to Prepare a Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK. J. INT ’L L. 7 (1998). Related matters of
importance, which are beyond the scope of this Article, include questions
about choice of law and personal jurisdiction over foreign litigants. For a
discussion of these issues, see generally Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified
Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 101 (1993).
5. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (Oct. 30, 1999), at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html
[hereinafter Hague Draft].
6. See Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge
for the ALI: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International Treaty,
and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635, 635 (2000).
7. Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman, U.S. of America, in
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN J UDGMENTS WORLDWIDE 123, 123 (Charles Platto &
William G. Horton eds., 2nd ed. 1993).
8. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
9. Id. at 202–03.
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The American Law Institute has begun to draft federal legislation on this issue, following cues from the Hague Conference
on Private International Law (“Hague Conference”).11 Any such
law will contain an important provision known as the “public
policy exception.”12 This provision creates an escape route that
allows a sovereign to refuse enforcement of an otherwise valid
foreign judgment when that judgment is contrary to the enforcing nation’s public policy. Thus, the infrastructure needed to
promote international trade is in place, but nations have a way
to avoid enforcing judgments that they are opposed to because
of some aspect of the foreign judgment.
It is important that such a provision be carefully constructed,
so that it can only be interpreted narrowly. This is especially
crucial should the proposed international convention ever be
finalized, giving nations only a small opportunity to deny enforcement. A narrow construction would help avoid the “parochial concept” that Chief Justice Burger spoke of in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.13 Even if the international convention is tabled for now, as appears to be the fate of the conve ntion in question,14 such narrow construction in any federal law
is important in order to show the international arena what the
U.S. finds acceptable. Furthermore, it will give the international business community a sense that its jud gments will be
enforced uniformly across the U.S., and it will give that same
community incentive to encourage other sovereigns to enforce
U.S. judgments.
This article proposes the direction that any federal statute
concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments should take.
First, this article addresses the need to federalize the enforcement of foreign judgments. Second, this article surveys the current state of the law concerning the enforcement of foreign
judgments. Third, this article explores the public policy excep10. See Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 123.
11. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 635–36.
12. Id. at 643.
13. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
14. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 AM . J. COMP. L.
203 (2001); James Love, Hague Diplomatic Conference Ends, Badly for Now,
CONSUMER
P ROJECT
ON
TECHNOLOGY,
June
20,
2001,
at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/info-policy-notes/2001q2/000038.html.
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tion to enforcement, as used in the U.S. and in Germany.15 Finally, this article makes a recommendation as to which direction any federal statute on the enforcement of foreign jud gments should take, regarding the public policy exception.
II. THE N EED TO FEDERALIZE THE ENFORCEMENT OF F OREIGN
JUDGMENTS
The international recognition and enforcement of judgments
play important roles in facilitating trade. A guarantee of enforcement and recognition provides, to those participating in
international trade, a certain security that legal rights will be
enforced and adequate remedies provided.16 However, there is
no global guarantee.17 For judgments flowing from U.S. courts,
there is no guarantee at all.18
Despite this, “the U.S. — without benefit of any treaties or
federal statute — [is] among the most receptive nations with
regard to recognition and enforcement of foreign-country jud gments.”19 The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution20 dictates that the judgment of any U.S. court will have
the same force in every court within the U.S. as it would have

15. The scope of this Article is limited to the enforcement of foreign
judgments without the privilege of any international treaty. The analysis
compares the U.S. use of public policy, see infra text accompanying notes 87–
135, and Germany’s use of public policy, see infra text accompanying notes
136–78. This limited comparison makes the assumption that the policy of
Germany is indicative of the policies of other European countries and of civil
law regimes.
16. Perez, supra note 3, at 44.
17. Unless a country has an enforcement treaty with the country in which
the judgment in question originated, enforcement comes about only because of
comity, which is “[t]he extent to which the law of one nation . . . shall be
allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation.” Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). The best example of a multilateral enforcement
treaty is the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments, 1968 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels Convention], which is a
multilateral treaty whose membership is comprised of the members of the
European Union.
18. The U.S. is not a party to any international treaties that would ensure
the enforcement of its judgments abroad. Karen Minehan, The Public Policy
Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis?, 18
LOY. L.A. INT ’L & COMP. L. REV . 795, 798 (1996).
19. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 123.
20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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in the rendering court.21 Though the Full Faith and Credit
Clause applies only to judgments from courts of the U.S., the
U.S. tradition of almost automatic enforcement extends to foreign-country judgments.22 However, no federal law on the subject exists, nor is the U.S. party to any treaty with a foreign
country that gives the U.S. an obligation to enforce the jud gment of a foreign court.23
In 1992, the U.S. proposed that the Hague Conference begin
discussions for an international convention on international
jurisdiction and foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters.24 Four years later, those discussions began,25 and in June
of 1999 a provisional draft convention was adopted.26 The proposed convention has been modeled after the Brussels Conve ntion on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters,27 in force among the members of the
European Union since 1968.28 Like the Brussels Convention,
the Hague Convention seeks to create a standard equivalent to
“Full Faith and Credit” for the judgments of signatory countries
in the courts of other signatory countries.29 However, negotiations at the Hague have not been finalized,30 and commentators
question whether the convention will ever come to fruition.31
Whether or not the convention comes about, it — and the discussion it has sparked — remains important. In the U.S., the
21. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 123.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Pfund, supra note 4, at 8.
25. Id.
26. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Future Hague
Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (last
visited Jan. 6, 2002).
27. Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda Silberman, Memorandum, Proposal for
Project on Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, Nov. 30, 1998, at
http://www.ali.org/.
28. See Brussels Convention, supra note 17. As of March 1, 2002, the
Brussels Convention will be transformed into a European Union Regulation.
See generally Council Regulation 2001/44/EC on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
2001 O.J. (L 12) 1. That brings no changes to this discussion.
29. See Burbank, supra note 14, at 204.
30. See, e.g., Love, supra note 14.
31. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 14, at 203; Silberman & Lowenfeld,
supra note 6, at 635–36.
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Convention has been the impetus for a new project at the
American Law Institute that involves preparing a draft of a
federal statute on the enforcement of foreign judgments.32 Currently in the U.S., state law governs the enforcement of foreign
judgments, thus creating a sense of uncertainty for foreigners.33
The U.S. can overcome this uncertainty by creating a federal
standard.34
In doing so, Congress should overcome a shortcoming of similar legislation.35 All agreements making mandatory the enforcement of another sovereign’s judgments have a public policy
exception, whereby the enforcing court is not required to enforce
any judgment that frustrates the enforcing state’s public policy.36 The draft convention includes such a provision in order to
encourage the adoption of the convention.37 However, past international agreements have left the exception open to wide and
varied interpretation, thus limiting the security an international agreement could provide to each state’s construction of
the public policy exception.38 Any federal legislation the U.S.
promulgates on this front should narrowly define the public policy exception and bind it to a reciprocity clause. Such legislation will then be in place to provide a model of the U.S. standard for any bi-lateral or multi-lateral enforcement treaties the
U.S. may join in the future.

32. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 635.
33. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 123.
34. Congress preempted state law in a similar area when it enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which created federal standards for the
enforcement of arbitral awards. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883
(1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2000)).
35. Both the New York Convention, see infra note 38, and the Brussels
Convention, see supra note 17, have aims similar to the proposed Hague
Convention and similar to that of the draft legislation being prepared by the
American Law Institute. See also infra notes 77–100.
36. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 643.
37. Hague Draft, supra note 5, at art. 28(1)(f).
38. The use of the public policy exception appearing in the United Nations
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards illustrates
this point. See generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter New York Convention].
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III. THE STATE OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE U.S.
There is only one universal principal regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments — no judgment will
be recognized if the court rendering judgment did so without a
valid basis of jurisdiction.39 The U.S. is the most receptive of
the major countries in recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments.40 However, state law, not federal law, governs the enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments.41
A. Hilton v. Guyot
The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken in the area of the enforcement of foreign judgments only once, in 1895.42 French
citizens brought an action in the Southern District of New York
to enforce a judgment rendered in France against their former
co-partners, who were U.S. citizens.43 In Hilton, the Court defined “comity of nations” as “[t]he extent to which the law of one
nation . . . shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of
another nation.”44 Under notions of comity, the Court defined
the conditions under which the final judgment of a foreign nation would be recognized in the U.S.:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the
trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice
between the citizens of its own country and those of other
countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the
court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or
fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason
why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the
39. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD , INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION
368 (1993).
40. See id.
41. Though a survey of how different countries view foreign judgments
would be interesting and relevant, this Article is limited to the effect of
foreign judgments in U.S. courts as compared to how U.S. judgments fair in
foreign courts. For a concise survey of how this procedure operates in other
jurisdictions, see ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE (Charles
Platto & William G. Horton eds., 2d ed. 1993).
42. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
43. Hilton v. Guyot, 42 F. 249, 249 (C.C.N.Y. 1890).
44. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163.
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merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this
country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial
or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the
judgment was erroneous in law or in fact. 45

In addition to the requirements outlined above, the Court
stated that when the foreign court’s decision was in opposition
to the policy of the enforcing court, then the enforcing court
“will prefer the laws of its own country to that of the stranger.”46
Ultimately, the French judgment was not enforced because
“international law [was] founded upon mutuality and reciprocity,” and this reciprocity did not exist.47 In other words, the
Court held that an otherwise valid foreign judgment should not
be conclusive on the merits unless there was “actual proof” that
a judgment of the enforcing court would be given the same
treatment in the foreign country from which the judgment to be
enforced was issued.48
In sum, Hilton requires that the following be shown before a
foreign judgment can be recognized in a court of the U.S.: (1)
the foreign court’s grounds for personal jurisdiction and for subject matter jurisdiction; (2) that proper notice was given to all
parties; (3) that the foreign proceedings were conducted in an
impartial manner; (4) that there was no fraud in the foreign
proceeding; (5) that the foreign judgment was final; and (6) that
enforcing the foreign judgment would not be contrary to the
public policy of the enforcing court.49
However, Hilton does not control.50 Justice Cuthbert W.
Pound, who sat on the New York State Court of Appeals in
1928, first questioned whether Hilton was precedent binding on
state courts, in Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique.51 In his opposition to the argument that “questions of
international relations and the comity of nations [were] to be
determined by the Supreme Court of the U.S.,” Justice Pound
stated that the question of enforcement “[was] one of private
45. Id. at 202–03.
46. Id. at 164–65 (quoting JOSEPH S TORY , COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 28 (3d ed. 1846)).
47. Id. at 228.
48. Id. at 227–28.
49. Id. at 202–03.
50. LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 390.
51. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123
(N.Y. 1926).
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rather than public international law.”52 As such, “[a] right acquired under a foreign judgment may be established in this
State [New York] without reference to the rules of evidence laid
down by the courts of the U.S.”53 This view became widely accepted in the U.S.54 Regardless, Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins55 invalidated Hilton56 by denying the application of
federal common law for a federal court sitting in diversity.57
However, Hilton remains representative of the law in the U.S.
The governing law is now dictated at the state level, with most
states generally agreeing with the principles of Hilton except on
the requirement of reciprocity.58
B. The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Act
In 1962, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws completed the Uniform Foreign Money Jud gments Recognition Act (“Uniform Act”).59 The Uniform Act codified the common law, thereby increasing the likelihood that
U.S. judgments will be recognized in countries that have reciprocity requirements for enforcement.60 As of October 2002,
thirty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have implemented the Uniform Act in some form.61 In

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 390.
55. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
56. LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 390.
57. Erie, 304 U.S. at 76–78.
58. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 636.
59. UNIF. FOREIGN M ONEY JUDGMENTS RECOG . ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263 (Supp.
1998), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/
ufmjra62.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) [hereinafter UNIFORM ACT]. For information about the Conference, see Uniform Law Commissioners, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, at www.nccusl.org
(last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
60. Robert B. von Mehren & Michael E. Patterson, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments in the U.S., 6 LAW & POL’ Y INT ’L
BUS . 37, 42 (1974).
61. For a listing of the states that have codified the Uniform Act, see
Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the . . . Uniform Foreign
Money Judgments Recognition Act, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/
uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufmjra.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2002).

File: Hicks Base Macro final.doc

164

Created on: 10/30/2002 9:27 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:24 PM

[Vol. 28:1

states that have not formally adopted the Uniform Act, its principles are usually applied.62
The Uniform Act defines a foreign judgment as “any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying the recovery of a
sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other
penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family
matters.”63 For enforcement in the U.S., the Uniform Act requires that the foreign judgment be final,64 “but the fact that a
judgment is subject to appeal . . . does not deprive it of the
character of final judgment for the purposes of recognition or
enforcement.”65 Furthermore, the Act makes clear that a foreign judgment is not conclusive if the foreign court fails to provide impartial tribunals and procedures that provide due process safeguards.66 Similarly, a foreign judgment cannot be considered conclusive if the foreign court lacked “personal jurisdiction over the defendant”67 or jurisdiction “over the subject matter” of the case at hand.68 In addition, the Act provides several
discretionary grounds by which the enforcing court can refuse
recognition.69
Discretionary grounds of refusal include the lack of proper
notice to the defendant,70 the presence of fraud in obtaining the
judgment,71 or the failure of the foreign court in refusing to recognize a contractually agreed-upon forum selection clause.72 In
addition, a court may refuse enforcement when the cause of action from which the judgment arises “is repugnant to the public
policy of [the enforcing] state.”73 In application, the law as codified by the Uniform Act does not differ greatly from the guidelines laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton.74
62. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 124.
63. UNIFORM ACT , supra note 59, § 1.
64. Id. § 2.
65. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 125.
66. UNIFORM ACT , supra note 59, § 4(a)(1).
67. Id. § 4(a)(2).
68. Id. § 4(a)(3).
69. See id. § 4(b).
70. Id. § 4(b)(1).
71. Id. § 4(b)(2).
72. Id. § 4(b)(5).
73. Id. § 4(b)(3).
74. See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); UNIFORM ACT, supra
note 59.
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Even where the Uniform Act has been enacted, the states differ on the need for a reciprocity requirement.75 In Hilton, it was
the lack of reciprocity in France that stopped the U.S. Supreme
Court from enforcing the French judgment.76 It was also reciprocity that worried Justice Pound in Compagnie Générale
Transatlantique.77 The majority of states and the Uniform Act
follow Justice Pound and reject “any requirement of reciprocity.”78
IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
No bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreement on the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments will require a state to
commit itself to recognize a judgment that would be contrary to
the public policy of the foreign state.79 This limitation exists
both in the Brussels Convention80 and in the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (“New York Convention”).81 Traditionally, this exception has been left undefined, to be interpreted according to the
desires of the court.82 Below is a survey of cases in which public
policy played a role in the decision whether to enforce a foreign
court’s judgment or an arbitration award.

75. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 636–37.
76. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 228; see supra text accompanying notes 47–48.
77. Johnston v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123
(N.Y. 1926).
78. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 636.
79. The draft convention makes discretionary the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments when such “would be manifestly
incompatible with the public policy of the State addressed.” Hague Draft,
supra note 5, at art. 28(1)(f).
80. The Brussels Convention does not require recognition of an otherwise
enforceable judgment when such recognition would be “contrary to public
policy in the State in which recognition is sought.” Brussels Convention, supra
note 17, at art. 27 (1).
81. The New York Convention does not require enforcement of an
otherwise enforceable arbitral award when such enforcement would be
“contrary to the public policy” of the enforcing country. New York Convention,
supra note 38, art. 5(1)(b).
82. See, e.g., Parsons & Whitemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale
de L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974)
(determining that the public policy exception of the New York Convention
should be interpreted narrowly).
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A. Public Policy As Applied in the U.S.
Although every state reserves the right to refuse enforcement
of a foreign judgment that is contrary to public policy, there are
few cases that deny recognition on the grounds of public policy
alone.83 The leading case on the public policy exception, Parsons & Whitemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale de
L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA),84 was decided in the context of
the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.85 However, the
holding also applies to the enforcement of foreign judgme nts.86
1. The Public Policy Exception According to Parsons
In Parsons, the dispute arose out of a delay in the construction of an Egyptian paper mill for Société Générale de
L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) (“RAKTA”) that an American
company, Parsons & Whitemore Overseas Co. (“Overseas”), was
to build.87 Before the contract was completed, Egypt severed
diplomatic ties with the U.S.88 Overseas then abandoned the
project and “notified RAKTA that it regarded this postponement
as excused by the [contract’s] force majeure clause.”89 RAKTA,
not agreeing that the delay was excused, began arbitral proceedings seeking damages for breach of contract.90 The arbitration panel found that the force majeure clause only excused
some of the delay and that necessary effort had not been made
to complete the contract.91 Damages in excess of $300,000 were
subsequently awarded to RAKTA.92
In enforcement proceedings in the U.S., Ove rseas defended
using the public policy exception of the New York Convention.93
83. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 129.
84. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
85. Id. at 969.
86. See, e.g., Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 129; Michael L.
Morkin, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments in
Illinois, 85 ILL . B.J. 364, 367–68 (1997).
87. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 972.
88. Id.
89. Id. The force majeure clause was designed to excuse performance
delay when the cause was beyond Overseas’ reasonable capacity to control.
Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 973.
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That exception allows the enforcing court to refuse enforcement
where “enforcement of the award would violate the public policy
of [the enforcing] country.”94 The court determined that the
public policy defense should be construed narrowly95 and enforced the award.96
Overseas sought to equate U.S. public policy with U.S. national policy.97 The court rejected this argument, because to do
otherwise would create “a major loophole” against the aims of
the New York Convention.98 The rule, as created by the Parsons court, is that otherwise enforceable foreign arbitration
awards will be enforced unless “enforcement would violate the
forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.”99 Because this defense is so rarely raised, the rule of Parsons
stands. The U.S. Supreme Court has no cases on point, and the
federal appellate courts have only five, including Parsons.100
Each of those quotes the “most basic notions of morality and
justice”101 language of Parsons and then rejects public policy as
a method to deny e nforcement based on the case at hand.102
2. Public Policy As Applied to the Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments
As noted earlier, courts rarely use the public policy exception
to deny enforcement.103 When the exception is raised, it is in-

94. Id. at 972; see New York Convention, supra note 38, art. 5(1)(b).
95. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974.
96. Id. at 978.
97. Id. at 974.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310 (2d
Cir. 1998); Waterside Ocean Navigation v. Int’l Navigation, 737 F.2d 150 (2d
Cir. 1984); Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691 (2d
Cir. 1978); Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
101. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974.
102. Europcar Italia, S.p.A., 156 F.3d at 313; Waterside Ocean Navigation,
737 F.2d at 152; Andros Compania Maritima, 579 F.2d at 699; Fotochrome,
Inc., 517 F.2d at 516.
103. See supra text accompanying note 90; Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald
T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested
Approach, 81 HARV . L. REV . 1601, 1670 (1968); see also Monrad G. Paulsen &
Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM . L. REV .
969, 1015–16 (1956) (voicing concerns about the use of the public policy
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frequently found to be the sole basis to preclude the recognition
of a foreign judgment.104
In Tahan v. Hodgson,105 the court refused to find that a difference in procedure amounted to a violation of public policy.106
The case involved the enforcement of an Israeli default jud gment.107 In that proceeding, the defendant was not given the
same notice that he would have received in a U.S. court.108 The
court did not feel this violated public policy because the notice
procedures utilized by the Israeli court were not “repugnant to
fundamental notions of what is decent and just.”109
In Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger,110 the district
court rejected the public policy argument, a judgment that the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.111 In
that case, a Belgian court had chosen to apply Belgian law to an
employment dispute, despite a contractual agreement to apply
Illinois law to the dispute.112 The court held that there was no
violation of public policy because it was not clearly inappropriate for the Belgian court to have applied Belgian law.113 When
enforcing the judgment, the district court went on to note that
they may have reached the same conclusion about choice of law
had they been “faced with the issue.”114
In Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.,115 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a decision
defense in order to apply local law in situations where there are local
contacts).
104. See Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The
standard [to meet the public policy exception] is high, and infrequently met.”);
Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 866 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the
public policy exception should apply “[o]nly in clear-cut cases”); Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918) (“We are not so provincial as
to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it
otherwise at home.”).
105. 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
106. Id. at 866 n.18.
107. Id. at 862.
108. Id. at 866.
109. Id.
110. 631 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987).
111. Id. at 318.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971).
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that enforced a default judgment obtained in England.116 The
public policy defense was raised regarding the decision of the
British court to award attorneys’ fees.117 The defendant argued
that because Pennsylvania law did not allow recovery of attorneys’ fees, the British judgment granting such fees should not
be enforced as it violated public policy.118 The court easily dismissed that argument, stating that the public policy exception
applied only when enforcement would clearly “injure the public
health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of
the administration of the law, or . . . undermine that sense of
security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of
private property, which any citizen ought to feel.”119 To the
enforcing court, the fact that British law differed with the law
of the enforcing court was not sufficient to reject enforcement on
the basis of public policy.120
3. When Public Policy Is Grounds to Refuse Enforcement
Where U.S. courts do find public policy violations, the forum
court usually has “substantial contacts” with the person or
transaction involved in the litigation.121 In Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,122 the plaintiff initiated proceedings in the U.S. seeking an injunction to prevent the defendants from seeking an injunction against the plaintiff in Britain.123 Though this case did not involve the enforcement of a
foreign judgment, the court recognized the relationship of an
anti-suit injunction preventing a judgment from a foreign court
to an enforcement proceeding.124 The court found that anti-suit
injunctions were justified when they were needed to “prevent
litigants’ evasion of the forum’s important public policies.”125
The court equated this principle to the rule that foreign judgments will not be enforced in the U.S. “when contrary to the
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 444.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 443.
Id. (quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 26 A. 665, 666 (P.A. 1893)).
Id. at 443.
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 60, at 63.
731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 918.
Id. at 931.
Id.
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crucial public policies of the forum in which enforcement is requested.”126
The holding relevant here is that the forum court has an interest in seeing that its public policy is not evaded.127 Thus, if a
case were to arise involving the enforcement of a foreign jud gment where it is clear that the enforcing court’s public policy
interests had been circumvented because the plaintiff pursued
litigation in a foreign court, the court would be justified in using
public policy to deny enforcement. In that situation, the interest of the forum court in citing public policy is validated because
of its relationship to the litigation.128
In Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, the court refused to enforce a
British libel judgment on the grounds that to do so would be in
violation of public policy.129 The Supreme Court of Maryland,
when asked to certify whether enforcement of the judgment
would be in violation of Maryland’s public policy, agreed with
the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia.130 The court
reasoned that the protections offered by the First Amendment
“would be seriously jeopardized by the entry of foreign libel
judgments granted pursuant to standards deemed appropriate
in England but considered antithetical to the protections afforded the press by the U.S. Constitution.”131 The refusal to enforce the judgment met the concern voiced in Laker Airways:
that litigants filed suit in a foreign nation in order to circumvent the public policy of the U.S.132 Telnikoff recognized that
the great disparity between the libel law in the U.S. and Britain
had created a phenomenon where prominent persons who had
received bad press in the U.S. were flocking to Britain to file
libel suits.133 The court conclud ed that to enforce a foreign
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 60, at 63.
129. Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995); see also
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)
(refusing to enforce a British defamation judgment because the British
defamation law did not comport with the First Amendment). For a discussion
of Bachchan and how the First Amendment plays a role in denying the
enforcement of foreign judgments, see Craig A. Stern, Foreign Judgments and
the Freedom of Speech: Look Who’s Talking, 60 BROOK. L. REV . 999 (1994).
130. Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 236–37.
131. Id. at 250 (quoting Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 664).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 121–28.
133. Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 250.
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judgment where the law out of which the judgment arose was
repugnant to the standards of the First Amendment would be in
violation of the U.S. Constitution.134
B. The Public Policy Exception As Applied to U.S. Judgments in
Germany
A few key cases from Germany illustrate the danger stemming from the assumption that U.S. law and procedure will be
applied in the courts of other nations.135 German law requires a
person to request an order of enforcement of the foreign judgment.136 Section 723 of the German Code of Civil Procedure
dictates that such an order is to be granted without reexamination of the substance of the judgment.137 That order is
to be granted only if the judgment has become final under the
law of the rendering court.138 However, no order is to be enforced if that judgment meets one of the exclusions of section
328 of the German Code of Civil Procedure.139 The exclusion
134. Id. at 250–51.
135. There is discussion that a fear of the public policy exception is
unfounded, that other courts follow the U.S. in interpreting the exception
narrowly. However, that assumption is not based on sound analysis. In The
Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Necessary or
Nemesis?, Karen Minehan looks at the European Court of Justice’s application
of the exception as applied to foreign judgments enforced under the authority
of the Brussels Convention. Karen Minehan, The Public Policy Exception to
the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis?, 18 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV . 795 (1996). She concludes that Europe construes the
exception narrowly. However, her analysis is flawed, because enforcement
under the Brussels Convention is equivalent to “full faith and credit.” A
better analysis would look at the view individual countries have taken toward
enforcing foreign judgments outside the coverage of the Brussels Convention.
136. The provisions of German law governing the enforcement of U.S.
judgments can be found in the German Code of Civil Procedure at sections 723
and 328. §§ 328, 723 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (ZPO). For a description, in
English, of the relevant German law, refer to David Westin, Enforcing Foreign
Commercial Judgments and Arbitral Awards in the U.S., West Germany, and
England, 19 LAW & POL’ Y INT ’L BUS . 325, 339–42 (1987).
137. See David Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments and
Arbitral Awards in the U.S., West Germany, and England, 19 L AW & POL’Y
INT’L BUS . 325, 339 (1987).
138. Id.
139. Id. Section 328 of the German Code of Civil Procedure does not allow
the enforcement of foreign judgments in the following circumstances: (1)
where the court rendering the judgment did not have jurisdiction under
German law; (2) if the defendant did not participate in the proceeding or
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relevant to this article does not allow enforcement of jud gments
that are incompatible with the fundamental principles of German law.
1. P. & Co. Inc. v. T. — Germany 1975
In P. & Co. Inc. v. T.,140 a West German Federal Supreme
Court decision dated June 4, 1975, the court refused to enforce
a judgment issued by a U.S. district court for a New York brokerage house against a German trader.141 The German defendant operated an import/export business in Germany and had
significant experience in speculative commodities trading on
foreign exchanges.142 In March 1967, he opened an account
with a brokerage house.143 After the customer incurred heavy
losses, the brokerage house closed the customer’s account in
July 1967, at which point the customer had a deficit of approximately $73,000.144 The brokerage house brought an action
against the German customer and obtained a judgment of
$73,421.71, plus costs of $1,937.77 and interest of $25,385.81.145
In enforcement proceedings commenced in Germany, the Federal Supreme Court of Germany refused to enforce the judgment because to do so would be in violation of German public
policy.146 The Federal Supreme Court based this decision on the
fact that the customer did not incur any liability for the commodities transactions under West German Law because he was
not authorized to trade in futures under the German Stock Exchange Law.147
otherwise defend himself (so default judgments are not enforced in Germany);
(3) if the judgment is somehow contrary to a domestic judgment or a
previously enforced foreign judgment; (4) if recognizing the judgment would
somehow be against German public policy or otherwise incompatible with the
basic laws of Germany; or (5) if there was no guarantee of reciprocity for a
German judgment in the nation of the rendering court. See id. at 339–41.
140. P. & Co., Inc. v. T., Judgment of June 4, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof,
BGH, Federal Republic of Germany, [1975] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
1600; [1975] Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft AWD 500, translated in
LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 444.
141. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 446.
142. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 444.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 444–45.
146. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 445–46.
147. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 445.
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2. Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co. — Germany 1989
In Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co.,148 the German court refused
to enforce a judgment initiated in a Massachusetts court and
finalized upon appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in 1987. 149 The plaintiff, an employee of Eastern
Marking Machine Corporation (“Eastern”), sought damages
from Eastern and from B. Grauel & Co. (“Grauel”) for injuries
sustained while she worked with a machine manufactured by
Grauel.150 On the day of the accident, the plaintiff was operating the machine, which imprinted information onto electronic
parts, and one of the parts fell.151 She turned the machine off to
retrieve the object.152 Accidentally, she “reactivated the machine,” and the “oscillating arm [of the machine] descended and
pinned the plaintiff’s wrist to the base of the machine.”153 For
more than twenty minutes, the plaintiff was trapped.154 The
accident resulted in permanent injury, leaving the plaintiff with
impaired grip strength and traumatic sympathetic reflex dystrophy.155
At trial, the jury found that the plaintiff’s employer was not
negligent.156 They determined that Grauel was ninety-five percent negligent, with the remaining negligence assessed to the
plaintiff.157 The jury also found Grauel had violated its warranty of merchantability.158 The jury awarded $275,000 to the
plaintiff;159 final judgment, once adjusted to account for the
plaintiff’s negligence, was entered at $261,250, plus interest.160
The appellate court affirmed this award.161
148. Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co., Landgericht Berlin, June 13, 1989, [1989]
RIW 988, translated in L OWENFELD, supra note 39, at 440.
149. Id., translated in LOWENFELD, supra note 39, at 443; see also Solimene
v. B. Grauel & Co., 507 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1987).
150. Solimene, 507 N.E.2d at 664.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 664–65.
155. Id. at 665.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 665 n.5.
161. Id. at 670.
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Once the American judgment was final, the plaintiff commenced an enforcement action in Germany,162 for $275,000 plus
$207,950.50 in interest.163 The action was denied because the
German court concluded that to enforce the judgment would be
in “violation of German order public” — enforcement would violate German public policy.164
The German court found several grounds supporting its position. First, the American judgment did “not contain any written statement of reasons” as to why the objections the defendant raised upon appellate review did not result in overturning
the jury verdict.165 Furthermore, the American court had not
included a statement explaining the reasoning behind the specific amount awarded.166 The German court also had difficulty
with an award given for breach of warranty without proof that
the product was actually defective.167 The court also disputed
the award of interest and the “height of the original award of
damages,” an amount far greater than would have been
awarded had the case begun in Germany.168 Finally, the German court felt that, according to German law, the plaintiff’s
negligence should have been considered more in assessing damages.169
3. The German Approach Contrasted with the U.S.
In vast opposition to the construction of the public policy exception in the U.S.,170 the German court in Solimene refused
enforcement because a different result would have occurred in a
German court.171 In P. & Co. Inc., the German court explicitly
held that enforcing a U.S. judgment that was in contradiction

162. Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co., Landgericht Berlin, June 13, 1989, [1989]
RIW 988, translated in L OWENFELD, supra note 39, at 440.
163. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 443.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id., translated in LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 444.
170. Parsons & Whitemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale de
L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974); see also
supra text accompanying notes 87–135.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 166–71.
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with German law was against German publ ic policy.172 This
view of the public policy exception is very broad, and seems to
indicate a “loophole” that Germany uses to refuse enforcement
of foreign judgments that somehow purports to violate the law
of Germany. It was this type of loophole that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit took pains to avoid reading into
the New York Convention when formulating the U.S.’s position
on the public policy exception in Parsons .173 Regardless, Germany’s position appears to be that foreign judgments — at least
foreign judgments without the protection of a formal enforcement treaty174 — based on a claim that somehow exceeds or violates the protections and privileges offered by German law, will
not be enforced because enforcement would violate German
public policy.175
V. A RECOMMENDATION FOR ANY U.S. F EDERAL LAW ON
ENFORCEMENT
As noted previously, the Supreme Court in Hilton felt that reciprocity needed to be shown before a foreign judgment could be
enforced in a U.S. court.176 Despite this, the Uniform Act does
not require reciprocity, nor do the majority of states.177 However, any federal law should have some sort of reciprocity requirement.

172. P. & Co., Inc. v. T., Judgment of June 4, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof,
BGH, Federal Republic of Germany, [1975] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
1600; [1975] Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft AWD 500, translated in
LOWENFELD , supra note 39, at 445–46.
173. See Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974; see also supra text accompanying notes
93–102.
174. Though such a discussion goes beyond the scope of this Article, it is
likely that a judgment issued from a country privileged to have an
enforcement treaty with Germany would not have merited the scrutiny given
to the U.S. judgment in Solimene. For a discussion on this, see Karen
Minehan, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis?, 18 LOY. L.A. INT ’L & COMP. L. J. 795
(1996), Minehan’s article includes a discussion of European judgments
enforced under the protection of the Brussels Convention.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 163–70.
176. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895); see also supra text
accompanying notes 47–48.
177. Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 636; see also supra text
accompanying notes 81–83.
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Any federal law on the enforcement of foreign judgments
should clearly define the public policy exception, so that courts
will narrowly construe the exception. The definition stated in
Parsons — that the public policy exception applies only when
“enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions
of morality and justice”178 — provides a working start. Any reciprocity requirement should be tied to the public policy exception. Thus, the result would be that the U.S. reserves the right
to refuse enforcement of a judgment coming from a country that
defines public policy more broadly, for example, the German
definition discussed above.179
The principle barrier to the enforcement of U.S. judgments in
foreign courts has been a broad construction of the public policy
exception. However, because the U.S. persists in being receptive to enforcing foreign judgments,180 other countries have little
incentive to change their ways by being more receptive to U.S.
judgments.181 Thus, the U.S. needs to provide incentives. If the
U.S. makes a statement of a change in its policy of liberal enforcement, other countries will realize that they need to be more
receptive to enforcing U.S. judgments.
Such a statement will also have the effect of giving the U.S.
more bargaining power at the Hague. The proposed Hague
Conference goes beyond the enforcement of foreign jud gments.182 It is a double convention, much like the Brussels
Convention, which defines the foundations for jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant before addressing the question of recognition or e nforcement.183 With the current state of affairs, and the
U.S.’s weak bargaining position, the U.S. stands in a position
where it will be forced to give up, on an international level,
many grounds for jurisdiction that it holds dear.184

178. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974.
179. See supra notes and text accompanying notes 136–71.
180. Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7, at 123.
181. See supra notes and text accompanying notes 90–135.
182. See generally Hague Draft, supra note 5.
183. See Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 8, at 638.
184. Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85
CORNELL L. REV . 89, 95–96 (1999).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The fate of the proposed Hague Convention on the enforcement of foreign judgments remains unclear.185 However, the
path the U.S. must take is clear. The U.S. needs to create a
federal law governing the enforcement of foreign judgments, a
process initiated by the American Law Institute.186 The current
state of negotiations at the Hague puts the U.S. in the unique
position of being able to increase its bargaining power. Negotiations are close to stalling.187 In the meantime, the U.S. has
begun the process of drafting a federal law.188 The final law
should make a statement expressing a change in U.S. policy
toward the public policy exception. The U.S. should be clear
that it will not continue to enforce judgments from countries
that refuse to enforce U.S. judgments through use of a broad
construction of the public policy exception.
The U.S. has created a standard for the world to follow —
judgments from foreign courts will be enforced when the foreign
court provides an impartial tribunal and due process safeguards,189 so long as the foreign court has “jurisdiction over the
defendant”190 and “over the subject matter.”191 The U.S. does
maintain discretionary grounds for refusal,192 but the U.S. construes those grounds narrowly193 to encourage “[t]he expansion
of American business and industry.”194 Parsons defined public
policy in terms of the “most basic notions of mo rality and justice,”195 in furtherance of the policy articulated by Chief Justice
Burger. That policy has served us well. However, the words of
185. See supra text accompanying note 12.
186. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda Silberman, Memorandum, Proposal
for Project on Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, at http://www.ali.org/
(last visited Jan. 6, 2002).
187. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 14, at 203.
188. See generally Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 6 (discussing the
American Law Institute project for a federal statute on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments).
189. UNIF. FOREIGN M ONEY JUDGMENTS RECOG . ACT § 4(a)(1), 13 U.L.A. 263
(Supp. 1998).
190. Id. § 4(a)(2).
191. Id. § 4(a)(3).
192. See id. § 4(b).
193. See generally Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 7.
194. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
195. Parsons & Whitemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale de
L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
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the Supreme Court in Hilton ring true: “international law is
founded upon mutuality and reciprocity.”196 The U.S. needs to
take a stand and tell the world that reciprocity is needed, and
that valid U.S. judgments should be enforced in foreign courts,
so as to facilitate the e xpansion of foreign trade.

196. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895).

